The military and Canada’s Arctic

Paint splash on wood

Between August 6th and 28th, the Canadian Forces are staging Operation Nanook up in Canada’s Arctic: a 700-person military exercise that includes sub hunting, search and rescue, and disaster response. The operation highlights both Canada’s general claim in the Arctic region and the specific commitment of this government to asserting it, even if ambitious icebreaker plans have been scaled back.

With the prospect of large ice-free areas in the Arctic likely only decades away, it does seem as though territorial disputes over sovereignty and resources will arise. As a result, military capacity could be important. Ironically, the melting of the ice may provide access to new reserves of oil and gas: further fuelling the destruction of the unique environment north of the Arctic circle.

Paths to geoengineering

Green paint, red rust

For a number of reasons, geoengineering is all over the news. The basic idea is to counteract the effects of climate change induced by greenhouse gasses. This can be accomplished in two basic ways. One is to use a separate mechanism to reduce the amount of energy the Earth absorbs from the sun. Orbiting mirrors and sulfate injection seek to do this. This approach is not ideal, partly because it would cause unknown side effects and partly because it would not stop the oceans from becoming more acidic. A more appealing route focuses on actively removing greenhouse gasses from the atmosphere.

The first way to do this is to encourage the growth of biomass. This is relatively easy, but has limited potential. Biomass is like a giant carbon cushion: it can be thick or thin, but it cannot keep growing forever. Increasing the amount of biomass on Earth could draw down the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere a bit, but only if we also manage to cut our greenhouse gas emissions to practically zero.

The second way – mentioned before – is to draw greenhouse gasses from the air and bury them, using carbon capture and storage technology (CCS). This could be done in two basic ways: (a) draw carbon dioxide (CO2) directly from the air and bury it or (b) grow biomass, burn it, collect the CO2, and bury that. The major limitations here are cost and technology. It remains unclear whether CCS can be made safe, effective, and affordable. It is also unclear whether it could be ramped up to a big enough scale to stop catastrophic climate change, in the absence of strong mitigation action.

The third option is to enhance the weathering of rocks. In the long term, this is where atmospheric CO2 actually ends up going. Some people are talking about speeding up the process, using various suitable types of rock and various mechanisms for increasing its rate of reaction with atmospheric CO2. Once again, the uncertainties concern scale and cost.

The three options that actually remove CO2 from the atmosphere are much more appealing than options that try to interrupt incoming sunlight. Each acts directly on the cause of anthropogenic warming, rather than trying to counter it by proxy. This is a bit like removing poison from a person’s body, as opposed to administering a supposed antidote with unknown effectiveness and side effects.

It remains unknown whether there will ever be a point where geoengineering is less costly per tonne of CO2 than various mitigation approaches. Right now, there are certainly greater opportunities in areas like energy efficiency and building design. That being said, research into CO2-removing technologies strikes me as having merit. They may eventually prove economically comparable to more expensive mitigation options; they may allow us to counteract activities that inevitably produce emissions, such as air travel; and they could give us some last-ditch options, if we find ourselves experiencing abrupt, catastrophic, or runaway climate change as a result of past emissions.

Coal, mercury, and CFLs

Those concerned about the mercury in compact fluorescent light bulbs should consider what the primary source of mercury contamination in North America is: coal-fired power plants. A report prepared earlier this year expects mercury levels in the Pacific to double by 2050, as the result of emissions from new coal plants.

This is especially relevant in places where summers are hot, since we might be paying a double climate and mercury price for the heat being produced by incandescent bulbs. If air conditioning is being used to get rid of it, the bulbs may well have negative efficiency in addition to their role in poisoning water supplies through those coal plant emissions.

All this is yet another reason why coal is the enemy of the human race.

Right about obstacles, wrong about consequences

Wasp on a purple spherical flower, Vermont

I was recently reminded of a common but worrisome mental phenomenon, when it comes to how people react psychologically to the challenge of climate change. They have a strong understanding of the basic political dynamics at work – short term versus long term, special interests versus the general interest, money talks, etc – but lack an appreciation for just how bad unmitigated climate change would be. They are cynical about the prospects for an appropriate political response, but not seized with the importance of producing one despite the difficulties.

As mentioned before, the business-as-usual case is 5.5°C to 7.1°C of temperature increase by 2100, with more to follow. Accompanying this would be ocean acidification, changes in precipitation patterns, and other impacts. This is a more significant difference than exists between our present climate and that of the last ice age, when much of North America was covered with kilometres of ice. In the somewhat understated language typical of scientists, the head of the Met Office has said that warming of this scale would “lead to significant risks of severe and irreversible impacts.” That isn’t a worst-case scenario, but rather their best guess about where we will end up unless we change course. It should also be noted that there are positive feedbacks not incorporated into models such as that of the Hadley Centre: notable among them methane from permafrost. With such feedbacks factored in, a significantly worse business-as-usual warming profile is possible.

In practical terms, it is challenging to converse with people who have this pair of outlooks. Their cynicism about politics is largely justified, and they are right to see climate change as a problem of unprecedented complexity and difficulty. Trying to make them aware of just how dangerous climate change could be is challenging, because it is easy to come off sounding like you are exaggerating things. People just aren’t psychologically prepared to accept what 5°C of warming could plausible do to human civilization, even within what are now rich states.

What communication strategies have the most promise for getting people to accept the dangerousness of climate change, and subsequently the need to push hard against the political status quo, so as to produce timely change? This isn’t an issue where we can roll over and let special interest politics win. The future of the human race is quite literally at stake.

Open thread: torture prosecutions

As many articles have described, the appropriate response to allegations of torture by Americans is controversial. Some argue that prosecutions are the only moral course, that they will restore US standing and draw a sharp line under the past. Others argue that, while justified, prosecutions would be a major distraction for the Obama administration, and will undermine progress on other fronts. Of course, domestic political necessities cannot provide excuses for ignoring war crimes.

That said, there is certainly a practical case to be made on both sides. While the general public hasn’t realized it yet, today’s leaders will be judged retrospectively on whether they set us on a path to avoid dangerous climate change. Prosecutions could kick off a new phase of partisan warfare that makes such progress impossible, given the need for support in the senate.

What do readers think? Are prosecutions warranted? Are they absolutely necessary? What costs would be associated with carrying them out, and with ignoring them?

The Oil Drum on the oil sands

Chains in a forklift

Over at The Oil Drum, there is a two part series on Canada’s oil sands.

The second part includes data on production trends, as well as projections on the share of Canadian oil production expected to come from the Athabasca oil sands. By 2019, they project it will be the dominant source of output. On climate change, the article makes the point that most of the emissions still come from burning the final fuel, which means adding carbon capture capabilities to upgraders isn’t a sufficient response, even if it does prove safe and economically viable. We really need to just leave that carbon in the ground.

On a side note, there is apparently an ‘The Oil Sands Discovery Centre’ museum in Fort McMurray.

100 days to Copenhagen

We are now 100 days away from the climate change conference in Copenhagen. Between 12,000 and 15,000 people are expected to attend and, at best, the conference will produce a treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol.

Canada is basically going to the conference with no intention of negotiating. The government has been clear that their climate plan is both the least and the most they are willing to do. As such, we won’t be making offers of the sort: “if other countries do X, we will do Y.” Hopefully, the critical players (the US, EU, China, and Japan) will be able to hammer together an agreement that everyone else will then latch onto. When it comes to getting started with a serious program of global climate change mitigation, we are way behind schedule.

Open thread: peak oil

Diseased leaves

The basic idea of the peak oil hypothesis is that global oil production will follow a bell-shaped curve over time, and that we are somewhere near the top of the bell. Once it is passed, a steep decline in output is expected, probably alongside quickly rising prices. The bell-shaped progression is one that has been observed in individual countries that have seen their output peak, including the United States. The Oil Drum is probably the premier website discussing the peak oil possibility.

A world with swiftly falling hydrocarbon availability and rising prices would have numerous economic and geopolitical consequences, from rising food prices to a probable scramble for alternative fuels. That being said, not everyone finds the peak oil theory convincing. Some argue that improved technology will allow us to tap ever-more-unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. Some argue that, rather than falling off sharply, global production will go into a long plateau phase. Others argue that the emergence of alternative fuels – such as biofuels – will fill the gap associated with falling production easily.

What do readers here think? Are we likely to see a sharp contraction in global oil output in coming decades? If so, what would the consequences be? (We already talked about hedging against the possibility.) What effect will new technologies have on this, and what consequences does it have for climate change outcomes and policy-making?

(On one side note, some economists who I’ve spoken to expect carbon pricing to seriously decrease the demand for oil by 2030 – to the point where global prices collapse and unconventional reserves such as the Athabasca oil sands are not worth exploiting. What do people think of that possibility?)

Foreign Policy on the end of oil

Foreign Policy has put out a special report on oil, entitled “The Long Goodbye.”

Topics covered include the ‘resource curse,’ geopolitical and pipeline issues in Europe, as well as nuclear and renewable forms of energy. It is nice to see major publications starting to devote serious consideration to the inevitable end of the hydrocarbon era.

Compensation for climate change

In Ethiopia, ministers from ten African countries are meeting to work out negotiating positions for the upcoming climate change talks in Copenhagen. One likely position will be a demand for financial compensation in response to the harm caused by climate change.

In principle, some compensation is probably justified between those who have knowingly engaged in actions that cause climate change and those that have suffered as a consequence. In practical terms, however, things are rather more complex. For one thing, it is dubious whether all of the governments with populations affected by climate change would effectively and equitably distribute any payments.

The world’s priority needs to be on getting effective mitigation action started. Without that, adaptation costs will eventually exceed what even rich states are able to spend on their own citizens. Effective negotiating tactics to drive a global mitigation agenda are really what especially vulnerable states should be concentrating on now. Some of these – such as paying for avoided deforestation – may have a similar character to a compensation scheme.