Rich and poor, under the Kyoto Protocol

This article in Slate makes a convincing case that the definitions of rich and poor states under the Kyoto Protocol make no sense and produce distorted outcomes:

The original climate negotiators had a simple way of defining wealth. First, they took the list of 24 countries that were part of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, a pre-eminent club of wealthy, democratic, free-market states that was formed in 1961; these included the United States, most of Western Europe, Japan, and a few others. Then they added several states of the former Soviet Union, like Russia and Belarus, as well as a handful from Eastern Europe, like Poland and Slovenia. This was basically Cold War logic on cruise control: First World and so-called Second World countries were rich; Third World countries were poor. The Kyoto Protocol, concluded six years later, maintained the same division. Rich countries agreed to institute caps on their greenhouse-gas emissions while poor countries agreed to do nothing.

The resulting deal had its flaws then. It makes absolutely no sense today. Belarus, for example, is lumped together with the rich countries, despite a GDP per person of about $10,000. As a result, it has an emissions cap like those in place for Europe and Japan. Kuwait, meanwhile, is considered poor. That means the oil-rich emirate is spared any obligations, despite the fact that its residents are about five times wealthier than the Belarussians.

Future climate deals will need to do a better job of distinguishing between those who have already developed and become wealthy (largely on the basis of CO2-generating greenhouse gas emissions) and poor states that are likely to suffer the worst effects of climate change after contributing disproportionally little to its emergence.

It makes sense to shift some states from the poor category to the rich one, and vice versa. It also makes sense to establish a special category for states that are (a) major emitters (b) relatively poor and (c) experiencing relatively rapid growth in emissions. An effective climate change treaty will need to address emissions from these states (such as India and China) as well as those from unambiguously rich states like Canada, Australia, and the United States. While the biggest issues in relation to the very poorest states concern how people will adapt to climate change, starting all major emitters (regardless of wealth) on the path to low carbon economies is the only way to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. Of course, establishing a new category doesn’t answer the tricky moral question of who ought to pay how much, in order to achieve the stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

Extreme environmental recklessness

As a metaphor for better understanding the relationship between humanity and nature, some people have used the image of a lifeboat. A more appropriate one is that of a submarine. It captures the complexity of our surroundings, as well as the real danger that messing around with critical systems in an unenlightened way will have dire consequences. Right now, humanity is in the process of setting fires that test the air filtration capabilities of the machine, altering the gas mixture in ways likely to produce unexpected results, and banging away at the outer hull with wrenches, based on the unthinking assumption that our ignorant pounding won’t produce critical leaks.

When one looks at the state of our resource, pollution, and climate policies and actions, one is left with little hope that the future will be a long or pleasant one for humanity. This is not a matter of protecting endangered species or pristine areas of forest; it is about not compromising the basic physical and biological systems that provide the fundamental requirements of human prosperity and existence.

Obama’s energy secretary

President-elect Barack Obama’s choice for energy secretary seems impressive: Nobel laureate Steven Chu. He is an experimental physicist, so he will be able to separate scientifically accurate information from bunk. He is also an advocate of alternative and renewable energy.

Since 2004, he was the head of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and concentrated his efforts on climate change. Hopefully, the choice reflects a commitment to addressing climate change, despite all the immediate clamour and apparent urgency of economic policy-making.

On an odd side note, about two thirds of the budget of the US Department of Energy is spent on nuclear weapons research and maintenance.

Leadership on climate, viewed in retrospect

A quotation from Joseph Romm highlights the differences between current and future perceptions of leadership quality:

Future historians will inevitably judge all 21st century presidents as failures if the world doesn’t stop catastrophic global warming.

Certainly, future generations forced to endure catastrophic climate change will consider their ancestors to have failed, whether they focus the blame on political leaders or others. I doubt the leaders of the 21st or late 20th century will be able to escape severe condemnation in a world that experiences mean temperature increases of 5°C or more, loses all its glaciers and sea ice, and experiences multi-metre increases in sea level.

Unfortunately, political leaders are conditioned to be a lot more concerned about the judgment of their voters at their next election (or of their generals, the next time the possibility of a coup is raised). The consequences of that may ultimately prove horrifically damaging.

Rapid ocean acidification in the Pacific Northwest

Ocean acidification is one of the wildcard elements of climate change. While both global warming and more acidic oceans are the result of increased carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations in the atmosphere, the mechanisms are completely independent. The warming occurs because CO2 absorbs some of the long-wave infrared radiation the Earth would otherwise broadcast out into space. The retention of that energy within the atmosphere warms the planet. Acidification occurs because more CO2 in the atmosphere causes increased hydrogen ion concentration in seawater. Both issues would be addressed through stopping net carbon dioxide emissions. In both cases, the magnitude and pacing of future harm is far from certain, even as a function of future emissions timelines.

New research by Professor Timothy Wootton of the University of Chicago has shown that acidification in the Pacific Northwest is taking place much more rapidly than expected; measurements taken off the coast of Washington state show that pH is falling 10 to 20 times faster than projected. One explanation for the discrepancy is the failure of previous models to take into account the effects of biological organisms. The research has also demonstrated that the effects of changes in pH on marine organisms are more pronounced than anticipated.

Compared to terrestrial life, scientific knowledge about the sea is very rudimentary in places. As a consequence, there is good reason to worry about important and unexpected changes arising because of our increasingly acidic oceans. This is all the more reason to keep the carbon that is so densely packed into coal and oil in the ground, rather than allowing it to be released into the atmosphere from our smokestacks, jet engines, and tailpipes.

Dealing with the oil sands is not enough

An intelligent article in The Calgary Herald makes the case that dealing with the oil sands is not a sufficient Canadian contribution to climate change mitigation. Firstly, this is because they represent a small fraction of total Canadian emissions and, even in the worst-case projections, are still a minority of emissions in a few decades. Secondly, it is because technologies developed to de-carbonize the oil sands are likely to be less generally applicable than those created for more widespread industrial activities. Thirdly, it is because many of the emissions associated with the oil sands occur wherever the fuels being produced are burned, rather than at the point of production, where they might be captured.The second point is an interesting one, and the overall case is strong:

The oilsands now produce about four per cent of Canada’s emissions; if production were to triple with no change in technology and all other emissions stopped growing, they could be as high as 10 to 15 per cent around 2025.

This is a big number, and it’s going in the wrong direction since if we want to avoid dangerous climate change, we should be driving our emissions to zero sometime soon after 2050. However, even if we shut down all oilsands operations tomorrow, Canada would still be one of the top greenhouse gas emitters’ per capita in the world. Fixing the oilsands will not get us off the hook.

While I think the authors are somewhat overconfident in the applicability of carbon capture and storage (CCS), they are right to say that dealing with the oil sands must be only one part of Canada’s overall climate change strategy.

In addition, we need to prevent the construction of new coal power plants (at the very least, those without effective CCS) and phase out those that already exist. We need to seek and exploit mitigation opportunities in all sectors – from agriculture to transport to heavy industry – with the ultimate goal of carbon neutrality. One important mechanism for creating the right incentives for lowest-cost across-the-board reductions is putting a price on carbon. That is not, however, sufficient to address all the externalities relating to climate change. Government also needs to work to improve standards and build intelligent infrastructure, supporting the choices that will lead to the emergence of a low-carbon society.

Alcoholic analogies to climate change

Two critical aspects of the problem of climate change can be well understood by means of alcohol-based analogy: the time lag between emissions and climatic consequences and the one-off nature of our decisions.

The last few decades have seen a surge in global greenhouse gas emissions. Due to lags in the climate system, the effects of those gasses are not yet felt, whether in terms of temperature or other climatic phenomena. It is as though we have started doing shots of vodka every thirty seconds. Even after the tenth shot, it is entirely possible that you are feeling lucid. You can talk, walk around, and drink more vodka. If you keep drinking at such a rapid pace until the point where you really feel the effects of the first shots, you have a whole mass of additional (and probably rather unpleasant) impacts still to come.

The reason this is so dangerous is that we only get one chance to decide when to stop drinking. Most people probably have a few experiences of youthful exuberance and realize they need to take into account the anticipated consequences of drinks, rather than just keep drinking until they cannot do so any longer. There is scope to learn from experience. As with global thermonuclear war, climate change offers no opportunities to learn by experience. We have one planet and, by extension, one timeline for greenhouse gas emissions and their atmospheric concentrations. If we are going to stop before we go too far, we are going to need the wisdom to anticipate consequences (as the IPCC and other scientific bodies have already done) as well as the will and good judgment to heed that advice.

The final issue to bear in mind is that of where the costs fall. The danger of drinking yourself to death is one that each individual engages with directly. By contrast, most of the dangers associated with climate change are inadvertently borne by those in future generations. Continuing to emit greenhouse gasses is thus somewhat equivalent to drinking while pregnant. While some of the health consequences might be borne by the drinker, most will be borne by the next generation and, in turn, by those who follow.

There are actually a couple of additional valid ways in which this analogy can be extended. One is to appreciating the difference between stocks and flows. Cutting annual emissions is like reducing how much vodka is in each shot. When emissions are rising, each shot is bigger. When emissions are falling, successive shots are smaller. Nonetheless, even small shots still increase your blood alcohol level. Right now, rising global emissions mean the planet is downing a bigger shot of greenhouse gasses every year. Stopping that growth is the first step, but it is no more of an adequate response in the long term than capping the size of the shots being taken at regular intervals.

A related extension has to do with carbon sinks. In this analogy, they are akin to your liver. They can absorb a certain quantity of greenhouse gasses before they fail. After that point, the further climatic effects of emissions are unmitigated. In the period when your liver is still functional, you can still drink small shots every thirty seconds. Eventually, however, you need to cut your intake/emissions to zero, before your liver/sinks fail.

Meeting in Poland, while the Amazon burns

Satellite images show that 11,968 square kilometres of the Amazon rainforest have been destroyed this year, 4% more than last year. The amount of carbon dioxide released when these forests are cut and burned is colossal. Indeed, reducing the destruction of tropical forest is probably the single cheapest way to reduce the rate at which greenhouse gasses are accumulating in the environment.

Hopefully, the delegates at the ongoing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Poznan, Poland will be able to make some progress on reducing deforestation. While higher cost mitigation will certainly need to take place, picking the low-hanging fruit could be a good way to make a difference relatively rapidly. That is especially important given the importance of the timing of emissions. The more steeply concentrations rise, the less time there is for any adaptation measures to be put in place. The risks of crossing critical climatic thresholds are also increased.

Talkin’ ’bout a coalition

The prospect of an NDP/Liberal coalition is certainly an intriguing one. For one thing, there is a lot of history to be made in parliamentary procedure. What can the Conservative government do to resist falling? How should, must, and will the Governor General act in different scenarios? If a coalition did come into being, how would it govern and how long-lasting could it be?

Given the NDP’s opposition to Stephane Dion’s ‘Green Shift’ carbon tax, it is especially unclear what sort of climate policies would emerge from a coalition government. They would be in a doubly weak position to create rules that would govern industry for years. Firstly, well-founded questions about the longevity of the coalition would make regulated industries wonder whether spending to meet new requirements makes commercial sense. In the absence of certainty about long-term climate policies, intelligent investments cannot be made. Secondly, there is uncertainty about what will happen to climate policy in the United States. How much of a priority will it be for the new Obama administration? Will Congress press forward or hold back on the issue? Will the US seek a national system, or will they try to come up with an integrated North American system as proposed by the Harper government? What will happen to the regional climate change organizations, such as the Western Climate Initiative?

These are certainly interesting times. Hopefully, the uncertainty will not serve to perpetuate inaction.

[Update: 28 January 2009] As of today’s Liberal response to yesterday’s Conservative budget, it seems the possibility of a coalition is dead, at least for now.

Emissions from the Poznan talks

This AFP story strikes me as both misleading and misguided: “UN climate talks to create 13,000 tonnes of carbon.” I suppose that might seem like a lot, if you aren’t used to thinking about tonnes of carbon dioxide.

Firstly, the headline is expressed incorrectly. The real estimate is 13,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide, not 13,000 tonnes of carbon, which would mean 47,710 tonnes of carbon dioxide. That is because adding the oxygen molecules increases the mass of a single atom of carbon by a factor of 3.67.

Secondly, 12 kilotonnes is a pretty trifling number, in the grand scheme of things. Canada emits about 1,917,808 tonnes of carbon dioxide per day. The world as a whole emits about fifty times that. If a few fifteen kilotonne meetings can help cut those figures substantially in the near to medium-term, they will have paid for themselves many times over.

There are certainly plenty of valid criticisms of the international efforts to stabilize the climate. The emissions associated with the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are probably among the weakest.