The moral choices in assigning rights

Tree at St. Hugh's College

The best piece of writing I have come across in the last week or so is a chapter from the Bromley and Paavola book on environmental economics that I have been reading. By A. Allan Schmid, it is called “All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral Choice as to Whose Interests Count.” The argument is that the idea of solving environmental problems in a purely technical way (internalizing externalities, to borrow from the economics lingo) is impossible. When a policy is represented that way, there is always a moral choice being concealed. In tort law, this becomes explicit through an instrument called nuisance.

If my neighbours are making homemade beer and the process produces a constant cloud of nasty smelling gas that wafts into my yard and through my windows, I could seek remedy in court. It would then be decided whether or not the smell constitutes nuisance. If not, the court effectively grants a right to produce the smell to my neighbours. I would then be free to try to convince them to use that right differently, for instance by paying them not to make beer.

If the court rules in my favour one of two things can take place. They can grant an injunction, forbidding my neighbours to make beer without my permission. This is great for me, since I can effectively sell them the right to make beer if the amount they are willing to pay exceeds the amount the smell bothers me. This is what Coase is alluding to in his argument that it doesn’t matter who you assign rights to, as long as bargaining can occur (See: Coase Theorem). Of course, he ignores the distributional consequences of assigning the rights one way or another. As an alternative to an injunction, the court can fix a set amount of damages to be paid. This relieves the nuisance, but gives me less scope to take advantage of the court’s decision.

What the example illustrates is that in creating policies to deal with externalities, the rights in question must be effectively assigned to one party or another. We either assign companies the right to pollute, which people around them can negotiate for them not to do, or we assign those people the right not to live in a polluted place, in which case the company has to go to them with an offer. The assigning of rights, then, isn’t a mere technical instrument for achieving an environmental end, but a matter of distributive justice.

Consider the case of fisheries access agreements in West Africa. West African governments have the sovereign right to exploit the waters in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). They can also choose to sell that right, as many have done, to the EU. The governments end up getting about 10% of the value of the fish that are caught, while suffering the loss of future revenue that is associated with the depletion of the fisheries (since they are exploited at an unsustainable level). In this case, the distributional consequences of West African governments being rights holders are fairly adverse. The incentives generated inflict harm on the life prospects of those whose protein intake previously came from fish caught by artisinal fisheries now rendered less productive due to EU industrial fishing. Likewise, the life prospects of future generations of citizens are harmed.

One of the best bits of the Schmid piece is the following:

A popular phrase contrasts “command and control” with voluntary choice. Another contrasts “coercive” regulations with “free” markets. This is mischievous, if not devious. At least, it is certainly selective perception. First of all, the market is not a single unique thing. There are as many markets as there are starting place ownership structures. I personally love markets, but of course I always want to be a seller of opportunities and not a buyer. Equally mischievous is the idea that externalities are a special case where markets fail. Indeed, externalities are the ubiquitous stuff of scarcity and interdependence.

He puts to paid the idea that there is a tradeoff between economic efficiency and moral principles. That is simple enough when you realize there is an infinite set of economically efficient outcomes, given different possible preferences and starting distributions.

Those wanting to read the entire piece should see: Schmid, A. Allen. “All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral Choice as to Whose Interests Count.” in Bromley, Daniel and Jouni Paavola (eds). Economics, Ethics, and Environmental Policy: Contested Choices. Oxford : Blackwell Publishing. 2002. pp. 133-147.

Seeking sources

I have decided to take on two of the three potential tutorial students for the St. Hugh’s summer school, primarily because it is a good opportunity to gain teaching experience. As such, I am in the process of finding sources on the following topics that would be appropriate for clever high school students:

  1. Causes and consequences of the 1973 oil price shock
  2. The creation and history of OPEC
  3. Distributive justice issues, regarding food
  4. Corporate involvement in Latin America, same sector

If anything jumps to mind immediately to anyone, I would appreciate if you would leave a comment.

Fish paper finalization

Embedded in Starbucks, working on the revision of the fish paper, I am reminded that this is a particularly good environment in which for me to get things done. Critical factors include the absence of food I could go make, inability to connect to the internet (without paying for wireless access – £5 an hour, shocking!), and an atmosphere that is just distracting enough to keep my mind on target. Somehow, typing on a laptop in a coffee shop just feels very efficient. The entire introduction to the NASCA report was written in TextEdit in the Starbucks on Granville Street, near Georgia Street, while waiting for Sasha Wiley. The ready availability of caffeinated beverages is another natural advantage; on hot Oxford summer afternoons, there is little more capable of inducing work than four shots of espresso served over ice.

With Dr. Hurrell in France between yesterday and August 3rd, the fish paper is my top priority. That seems in keeping with a) the importance of publication if I hope to get anywhere in an academic context and b) the name recognition of a journal run by MIT. Getting it ready for publication involves two kinds of tasks – one relatively easy, and one relatively hard.

The easy task is contextual editing, as described in a previous post. I need to cut down a few sections that are non-critical, and perhaps reflective of the original status of this work as a term paper for an international law class. I need to tweak the language in a few spots and come up with a few neat ‘bullet point’ style recommendations of the sort Fernando and I generated for the NASCA report. I wouldn’t expect the above to take more than a couple of days.

The hard bit relates to a few scientific claims that are attributed to Clover – a journalist – rather than to specific scientific papers. Ideally, I should be able to cite both him and a scientific source for each. In practice, it may be hard to find sources that say exactly what he does. The statements in question are part of a general pattern broadly corroborated by scientific sources, but it is obviously better to have specific support than general support.

By the time I leave for Scotland on the 27th, the final copy of the paper should have been sent off to the editors of the journal. Naturally, I would appreciate if someone were able to give it a fine-tooth-comb going over, so as to ensure that no minor mistakes of language remain in the final version.

PS. Another pigeon hole check has revealed no Etymotic ER6i headphones. Once they arrive, I will finally be free from the lowest-common-denominator background music that is a feature of all corporate coffee shops. (I can hear Ms. Wiley gnashing her teeth at my corporate tolerance, halfway across the world, but I find the very plastic conformity of all Starbucks locations to be among the primary reasons for which they are such good places to get work done.)

Ten years of Daily Shows

American Institute Library

Yesterday was a notable birthday, today is too: the tenth anniversary of The Daily Show. I maintain that The Daily Show is the only televised news that is really worth watching. Indeed, it is the only kind I have felt the slightest impulse towards watching regularly. Whereas television news is usually a repetitive and less detailed summary of printed news, The Daily Show says something new.

Given how absurd American politics and world current events can be, it seems strangely appropriate to have it presented in a comedic form. A certain night in November 2004 might have been even more psychologically damaging, but for their special coverage. In any case, I salute Jon Stewart and I wish I had one of these shirts.

Environment and representation

Revising the fish paper, and reading Bromley and Paavola on environmental economics, the question of the nature of ethical resource relations between the rich and poor world keeps arising. In particular, the issue of paternalism is persistent. The question must be asked of whether there are individuals or groups who ‘know better’ when it comes to environmental choices and, if so, how the superiority of their understanding can be verified and legitimated.

Whether it is Angolan diamonds or West African fish, there is often a case to be made that rich world access to commodities in the poor world has harmful effects. It may fuel conflicts (as with diamonds), it may reduce the future possibilities for resource use within the poor countries (as with fish), and it may enrich corrupt or non-representative elites while not benefitting the population at large. People have generally been critical of the Chinese government for striking resource deals with states that the west shuns because of their poor human rights records and lack of democratic credentials.

The big question, it seems, is how to treat the interests of people in non-representative political systems. Do people in democratic systems (or rich countries) have an obligation to effectively act as their agents, anticipate their preferences, and try to guide outcomes towards satisfying them?

Much recent policy seeks to do exactly this. When China decides that the electricity and prestige generated by the Three Gorges Dam is worth more than the flooded territory and other costs of construction, on what basis can or should we say that they are wrong? We can accuse them of short-term thinking (though our right to do so in anything beyond an advisory manner is dubious) or of violating the rights of individuals (which almost always happens when people are forced to do things in systems that lack political and legal accountability). All that said, the idea that rich states or international organizations can take up the cause of representing the general population of China strikes me as a problematic one.

Naturally, there are also accusations of hypocrisy. How many environmental choices within the rich world have been made on the basis of short-term thinking? How many have harmed a great many individuals for dubious value? Do not the states which are undergoing the process of development today have the right to make the same mistakes as states that have already developed did in the past? To the last of those, it can be responded that our level of understanding about the world has improved substantially since the industrial revolution. When developed states first used DDT, they were not aware of important consequences the introduction of that chemical into the environment would have. Arguably, the same can be said of all the coal that was burned to generate steam power and electricity. The trickier question is whether improved knowledge creates an obligation on the part of developing states to make choices that avoid incurring the kind of harms already suffered in the developed world.

There are also international efforts to encourage better environmental policy that might reasonably be seen as empowering, rather than paternalistic. The Publish What You Pay Initiative and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative are trying to encourage (or require) resource extracting firms to publish the details of their contracts with governments. This allows scrutiny by the domestic regulators of the firms, by different branches of the governments involved in the contracts, by people living under the authority of those governments, and by international bodies. Presumably, having access to such information could allow for the mobilization of political energy, on the part of any or all of those organizations. At first glance, this model is more appealing than the paternalistic one.

In the end, this is reflective of a larger overall tension within environmental debates. There are certain groups that are often willing to promote optimum outcomes (scientists and economists in particular) that are based on analyses that are rigorous according to standards established within their own disciplines. Then, there is a political process that arrives at decisions on the basis of ongoing political realities – many of which have nothing to do directly with the nature and importance of the environmental issues in question. Finally, there are those who assert the fundamental rightness of views or policies on the basis of some combination of these considerations and others. Such a view suggests that there is an ideal policy (or at least a better policy) out there, but that its nature is not fully captured in technocratic assessment and does not arise spontaneously from the political process. I believe this intuitively, but have a great deal of trouble sketching out the details.

On what basis, however, can the desirability of this kind of policy be asserted? One mechanism is democratic endorsement. Many theorists assert the value of open discussion as a mechanism through which policy might be chosen. Of course, translating discussion into action brings it up against all the barriers produced by existing distributions of power. Likewise, people are not equally capable of engaging in discussion – especially when expert knowledge is a required currency in order for arguments to be taken seriously.

These are not questions to which I see straightforward answers. There is no group that can be trusted to evaluate the situation from a neutral perspective. There is likewise no solid way to assert which values are important, and how important each is with respect to others. The easiest solution, from the perspective of those trying to act in the world, is to identify those areas where present practice deviates most substantially from ideal practice as best understood, and where the gap between the two can be closed or reduced through available and acceptable means. I call this the strategy of picking low-hanging fruit. Of course, the assumption behind this strategy is that the big questions above will eventually be resolved to the satisfaction of most, allowing for further progress. There is plenty of reason to be skeptical about that.

Nomenclature

Whoever names Israeli operations in Lebanon must have a real sense of irony:

Operation Peace for Galilee: Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, in support of Maronite Christian militias. Initially presented by Ariel Sharon as a plan to advance 40km into Lebanon, it was apparently always meant to go as far as Beirut.

Operation Accountability: A week-long invasion of southern Lebanon in 1993.

Operation Grapes of Wrath: A series of air and artillery strikes in 1996, designed as an assault against Hezbollah. Admist the 20,000 shells fired into Lebanon was one that killed 118 Lebanese civilians who were sheltering in a UN base.

Regardless of the validity of Israeli arguments about a strong retaliatory response being the only way to prevent future kidnappings and attacks, ongoing Israeli actions appear increasingly out of proportion to their ostensible provocations. Hopefully, some means will be found soon to rein in the situation.

Frontier justice

In other depressing news, there are apparently two Americans: Daniel Strauss and Shanti Sellz, who are being charged for transporting three illegal migrants trying to cross the US-Mexico border to a hospital, when they were dying of thirst. They face up to 15 years in prison and $500,000 in fines.

Legally, the case seems quite clear cut. The defence of necessity allows you to break the law when doing so serves some over-riding purpose. Someone with a suspended license can drive their critically injured child to the hospital, then get off the charge of violating the suspension by claiming that is was necessary to avert a far greater evil. Preventing three people from dying in the desert obviously overrides questions about the legality of assisting those attempting to migrate illegally.

What is most ironic is that the people prosecuting this case would almost certainly defend themselves as Christians – given that the prosecution can only be motivated by a desire for political point-scoring, and not being religious in America is politically suicidal. For would not Jesus himself have argued that if you come across a man dying of thirst in the desert, it is your Christian duty to report him to the proper authorities?

It amazes me that neighbouring democratic states with an increasing number of economic and institutional connections can nonetheless completely fail to accord the most basic ethic of due consideration to each other’s citizens. The prosecutors should be ashamed of themselves, and these charges should be summarily dismissed.

PS. Amnesty International has a campaign on this.
It is also being discussed on MetaFilter.

Violence around Israel

As is so often the case, it is only with the greatest of dismay that one can read headlines from the Middle East at the moment. What baffles me is that I cannot see what anyone hopes to gain from this looming conflict. Kidnapping Israeli soldiers is a good way to provoke massive retaliation (or provide justification for attacks planned before the kidnapping). At the same time, what Israel really hopes to achieve through incursions into Gaza and Lebanon is unclear. Almost certainly, there actions are further imperiling the hostages. The only comprehensible reasoning I can come up with is that the Israelis fear that anything less than a massive response to these kidnappings would encourage more.

The prospect of large-scale violence in the region, including considerable loss of life, is increasingly real. I am suspect that covert diplomatic efforts are being made on the part of the United States and others to urge greater restraint upon Israel, though a public condemnation seems pretty unlikely.

The only possible solution in the region is normalized relations between Israel, its neighbours, and a viable Palestinian state comprising the great majority of the West Bank and Gaza. The prospects of that point being reached are in the process of receding far off into the distance. And we can really do is hunker down for more bloodshed, while watching the oil producing nations (including Canada) rub their hands together in greedy anticipation of the further windfall from turmoil-boosted prices ahead.

[Update]: The Economist on this (requires subscription)
Patrick Porter on Israel and Lebanon (via OxBlog)

Fish paper publication upcoming

I may be delerious because it’s 6:30am, but this seems pretty unambiguous:

I really enjoyed the piece you wrote on EU policies regarding fishery sustainability off the coast of West Africa. I’d like to work with you to prepare your piece for publication in [the MIT Internatinal Review].

You mentioned on your cover letter that you would be willing to “re-focus it in the most appropriate direction and summarize other sections.” This will probably comprise the bulk of our work together, as your piece was very well written to begin with.

An excellent bit of news by which to start the day. I am off to London.

Thesis development

Talking with Dr. Hurrell about the thesis this evening was rather illuminating. By grappling with the longer set of comments made on my research design essay, we were able to isolate a number of interwoven questions, within the territory staked out for the project. All relate to science and global environmental policy-making, but they approach the topic from different directions and would involve different specific approaches and styles and standards of proof.

Thesis idea chart

The first set deal with the role of ‘science’ as a collection of practices and ideals. If you imagine society as a big oval, science is a little circle embedded inside it. Society as a whole has a certain understanding of science (A). That might include aspects like objectivity, or engaging in certain kinds of behaviour. These understandings establish some of what science and scientists are able to do. Within the discipline itself, there is discussion about the nature of science (B), what makes particular scientific work good or bad, etc. This establishes the bounds of science, as seen from the inside, and establishes standards of practice and rules of inclusion and exclusion. Then, there is the understanding of society by scientists (C). That understanding exists at the same time as awareness about the nature of the material world, but also includes an understanding of politics, economics, and power in general. The outward-looking scientific perspective involves questions like if and how scientists should engage in advocacy, what kind of information they choose to present to society,

The next set of relationships exist between scientists and policy-makers. From the perspective of policy-makers, scientists can:

  1. Raise new issues
  2. Provide information on little-known issues
  3. Develop comprehensive understandings about things in the world
  4. Evaluate the impact policies will have
  5. Provide support for particular decisions
  6. Act in a way that challenges decisions

For a policy-maker, a scientist can be empowering in a number of ways. They can provide paths into and through tricky stretches of expert knowledge. They can offer predictions with various degrees of certainty, ranging from (say) “if you put this block of sodium in your pool, you will get a dramatic explosion” to “if we cut down X hectares of rainforest, Y amount of carbon dioxide will be introduced into the atmosphere.”

The big question, then, is which of these dynamics to study. Again and again, I find the matter of how scientists understand their legitimate policy role to be among the most interesting. This becomes especially true in areas of high uncertainty. The link from “I know what will happen if that buffoon jumps into the pool strapped to that block of sodium” to trying to stop the action is more clear than the one between understanding the atmospheric effects of deforestation and lobbying to curb the latter. Using Stockholm as a ‘strong case’ and Kyoto as a ‘weak case’ of science leading to policy, the general idea would be to examine how scientists engaged with both policy processes, how they saw their role, and what standards of legitimacy they held it to. This approach focuses very much on the scientists, but nonetheless has political saliency. Whether it could be a valid research project is a slightly different matter.

The first big question, then, is whether to go policy-maker centric or scientist centric. I suspect my work would be more distinctive if I took the latter route. I suspect part of the reason why the examiners didn’t like my RDE was because they expected it to take the former route, then were confronted with a bunch of seemingly irrelevant information pertaining to the latter.

I will have a better idea about all of this once I have read another half-dozen books: particularly Haas on epistemic communities. Above all, I can sense from the energy of my discussions with Dr. Hurrell that there are important questions lurking in this terrain, and that it will be possible to tackle a few of them in an interesting and original way.