Category: Politics

All posts on what Bismarck called “the art of the possible”

Population control in the rich world

There is a lot of talk about reproductive choice in the developing world, and it is extremely important. All human beings have the right to engage in sexual activity on the basis of their free choices and have children only when it is their will to do so. It is an important role of the state to ensure that those rights are not violated.

That being said, there seems to be a disjuncture between concern about rising populations in the developing world and environmental problems. All else being equal, more humans tends to mean more threats to the ecosystems that sustain us. Of course, not all else is equal. People in rich states consume dramatically more resources than those in poor ones. This is true in terms of energy resources (oil, coal, gas, uranium), food resources (especially meat), and climatic impact.

Certainly, we should work to give reproductive control to people (especially women) living in developing states. However, given the concerning destruction of the natural world, does it not make sense to reduce policies that encourage reproduction in rich states? I am not advocating mandatory limits on bearing children. I am simply suggesting that it may be prudent to reduce the degree to which taxpayers in general subsidize those who choose to breed. Even with ample fossil fuels, the world is groaning and straining because of the current human population – especially those who live especially unsustainable lives in rich states. When we reach the point where those fuels are depleted – or when we refrain from using them due to climate concerns – energy intensive lifestyles will become even more unsustainable.

Increasing the cost of children may be an important mechanism for improving the welfare of future generations. No child deserves to live in poverty, but parents who choose to reproduce deserve to bear the great majority of the costs of doing so.

Pick your poison: nuclear or ‘clean coal’

One issue raised at the conference I recently attended was this: both Ontario and Germany are in the position where they want to phase out coal-fired power plants. In addition, Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power, whereas Ontario is strongly considering maintaining and expanding existing facilities. In order to phase out nuclear without continuing to rely on dirty coal, one presenter asserted that carbon capture and storage (CCS) on coal plants is the only feasible and politically acceptable option.

Assuming for the moment that maintaining adequate energy supplies in the near-term requires one or the other, which is the more suitable choice? With nuclear, the risks are largely known and the biggest uncertainties relate to costs. With CCS, there are huge uncertainties about cost, alongside big uncertainties about safety, scale, and feasibility. The worst you get with nuclear is a lot of wasted taxpayer money, more nuclear proliferation, contaminated sites, and some accidents. The worst you get by relying on CCS is wasted money, accidents, proliferation of coal plants, and the extension of the high-carbon phase in whatever countries bet wrongly that it will work.

To me, if the choice is exclusively between nuclear fission and CCS right now, it seems that nuclear is the most risk-averse option. That being said, the calculation may change a great deal when you factor in opportunities for conserving power, using it more efficiently, and generating it using renewables. That won’t make CCS more attractive, relative to nuclear, but it may mean we are presented with a less stark choice than was assumed at the outset of this discussion.

Insurance, liability, and climate change adaptation

Yesterday, I saw a fascinating presentation by Dianne Saxe: a lawyer who explained the legal liabilities that could arise as the result of climate change. The particular focus was on the government, and ways in which failure to effectively adapt to climate change could produce a legal risk. For instance, the government might be sued for failing to establish building standards that reflect our understanding that extreme weather events will get worse.

Legal liability and insurance are definitely very important elements of the climate change problem. Insurance companies probably have the most reason of anyone to get the most accurate and precise estimates about the various future impacts of climate change. In a world where mitigation does not occur rapidly enough, they will certainly find themselves with a lot of extreme new risks threatening their profitability: especially given how many of the probable impacts of climate change are included in existing property insurance. Climatic change that produces more intense windstorms is a major issue for you if you insure millions of houses and your policies include coverage for wind damage.

Arguably, the insurance industry and society-wide concerns about liability could be a good motivating force for making society more resilient to climate change. That is especially true when there is an opportunity to create price incentives: charging more (or refusing to offer coverage) for houses in hurricane zones, offering reduced premiums for houses built to withstand projected changes, and so forth. Of course, lots of ethical issues arise in connection with the governmental role. Sometimes, it is quite legitimate for government to step in and mandate that insurance be provided to a certain group, or for a reasonable price. At other times, such interventions undermine the ability of insurers to encourage sensible behaviour.

It will be a very interesting area to watch: both in terms of the commercial decisions taken by insurance companies and in relation to court cases and new precedents that arise.

Feynman on bad science

A serious section concludes Richard Feynman’s Surely You’re Joking, in which he denounces various forms of bad science. He talks about the pseudoscience of UFOs and reflexology, but also about problems with the work done by credible scientists, such as the bias towards publishing positive results and ignoring negative or inconclusive ones. He raises issues about the quality of school textbooks and the ethics of those who publish and select them. He stresses the importance of retesting your assumptions, properly calibrating new equipment, and providing detailed information on the sources of error you think exist within your experiments. He also provides an important example of scientists fudging their numbers so as not to contradict a famous result.

At the very end, he gives some advice to those who are called upon to provide scientific advice to governments:

I say that’s also important in giving certain types of government advice. Supposing a senator asked you for advice about whether drilling a hole should be done in his state; and you decide it would be better in some other state. If you don’t publish such a result, it seems to me you’re not giving scientific advice. You’re being used. If your answer happens to come out in the direction the government or the politicians like, they can use it as an argument in their favor; if it comes out the other way, they don’t publish it at all. That’s not giving scientific advice.

…

So I have just one wish for you — the good luck to be somewhere where you are free to maintain the kind of integrity I have described, and where you do not feel forced by a need to maintain your position in the organization, or financial support, or so on, to lose your integrity. May you have that freedom.

It is a warning that is especially pertinent today – particularly where science and politics collide in relation to environmental issues. The temptation to manipulate the science can be extreme. At the same time, the importance of transmitting scientific conclusions in a way that is both accurate and comprehensible is considerable. Maintaining scientific integrity while also providing accurate and applicable advice is a key ethical and professional requirement for today’s scientists, as well as those on the political and bureaucratic side who work with them.

Environmental ‘extremism’

Sometimes, living up to one’s ideals requires becoming an extremist. That is to say, speaking and acting in a manner very different from what is normal within the population. Not doing so risks being a hypocrite, since you would be telling others to take actions that you are personally unwilling to take. At the same time, the connotation of ‘extremist’ is almost entirely negative. People have a general feeling that there is an acceptable range of thoughts and behaviour and that those on or beyond the edges are dangerous.

Consider the issue of Al Gore’s (non) vegetarianism. He has resisted calls to follow the actions of IPCC chairman Rajendra Pauchauri and renounce meat, as a means of reducing carbon emissions. At the same time, he is calling for people to make large lifestyle changes for the sake of the planet. Not going vegetarian leaves him open to charges of hypocrisy, even from those who oppose his position on what should be done about climate change. At the same time, choosing lifestyle options like vegetarianism risks getting him branded as an ‘environmental extremist’ by the political mainstream. Environmentalists who have been calling for the issue of climate change to be pan-ideological would likely regret seeing him thus marginalized.

There are generally good reasons to feel nervous about thinking or acting far outside the mainstream. In many cases, it suggests that you have made a serious error in your thinking. That being said, it must be acknowledged that there are situations when mainstream thinking is based upon serious errors of information, judgment, or understanding. In these cases, one is presented with the challenging question of whether it is best to be principled yet easy to ignore or more influential and somewhat hypocritical.

Massive anti-terror database contemplated in the UK

British Transport Secretary Geoff Hoon has been saying some worrisome things about terrorism, security, and civil liberties. He is backing a plan to create a massive database of mobile and internet communications, for purposes of fighting terrorism. One worrisome aspect is the suggestion that it would be used to deal with “terrorists or criminals.” Technologies initially justified as an extreme measure necessary to fight terrorism will always spread to more banal uses, with a greater scope for abuses.

Indeed, that is the biggest issue that needs to be weighed against the possible terror-fighting capacity of such databases. They will inevitably be abused. Furthermore, governments are far more dangerous than terrorists, both when they are acting in malicious ways and when they are trying to be benign. Modern history certainly demonstrates that, while the power of terrorists to inflict harm is considerable, the ability of states to do so is extreme.

Previously:

Stern on the opportunities in recession

Nicholas Stern – most notably the author of an eponymous report on the economics of climate change for the British government – has a piece in The Guardian arguing that the financial turmoil ongoing around the world provides an opportunity to refocus investment on low-carbon options:

The International Energy Agency estimates that world energy infrastructure investments are likely to average about $1 trillion a year over the next 20 years. If the majority of this is low-carbon, and some of it is brought forward, it will be an outstanding source of investment demand. So too will be the investments for energy efficiency, many of which can be labour-intensive and are available immediately.

It makes sense to highlight how the current pause in headlong, high-carbon growth can help us to reorient the global economy. Stabilizing climate requires a constant commitment to reducing emissions: not one that wavers when growth seems to strong to resist or too weak to threaten.

Martin Hellman on the risk of nuclear war

Despite the end of the Cold War, there remains some possibility of a major nuclear exchange between some combination of those world powers with more than a couple of hundred nuclear weapons. Such an outcome could arise through accident or miscalculation, unauthorized launch, or simply through the progressive stressing of the situation, in a manner akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, of the Able Archer exercise in 1983.

Martin Hellman – one of the three civilian inventors of public key cryptography – has written a piece describing some statistical ways through which we could contemplate the risk of global nuclear war, as well as evaluate it relative to other threats. As a near-term nightmare scenario, the massive use of nuclear weapons surely exceeds the threat posed by climate change: climatic change across a decade is highly abrupt, whereas the time between the decision to use nuclear weapons and the generation of mass casualties would likely be only minutes.

Based on the frequency with which near misses have taken place, Hellman argues that the perpetuation of the current global nuclear situation carries a 1% per year risk of mass nuclear exchange. He estimates that this exceeds the risk of living beside a nuclear power plant by 1000 to 1 and has a clever rhetorical device for making that concrete:

Equivalently, imagine two nuclear power plants being built on each side of your home. That’s all we can fit next to you, so now imagine a ring of four plants built around the first two, then another larger ring around that, and another and another until there are thousands of nuclear reactors surrounding you. That is the level of risk that my preliminary analysis indicates each of us faces from a failure of nuclear deterrence.

Surely, if his estimate is anywhere near correct, all the ongoing concern about new nuclear power plants should be superseded more than one thousandfold by concern about the state of security in the face of nuclear war. After all, everybody lives with the risk associated with global thermonuclear war and nuclear winter. Only those living fairly close to nuclear power plants bear acute risks associated with meltdowns.

Hellman’s warning is akin to the one repeatedly sounded by former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who himself revised the American nuclear warplan for the Kennedy administration in 1963. In both cases, the suggestions are similar: work to reduce the number of weapons, increase the time required for anybody to use them, and avoid the complacent belief that the lack of explosive accidents or attacks since the Second World War proves them to be impossible.