Politics – Page 159 – a sibilant intake of breath

Dams and climate change

In the past, environmental groups have often opposed hydroelectric projects, both in the form of large dams and smaller run-of-river projects. Now, I think the seriousness of climate change overrides past objections about destroying habitat and disrupting ecosystems in rivers. While we should definitely take cost-effective measures to reduce the harmful impacts of dams (for instance, removing trees from the area that is to be flooded), I think we need to accept more dam construction as a necessarily part of moving to a sustainable low-carbon economy.

Dams have virtues as a consistent source of energy for electrical generation. Their variable output also means they can be used to balance out production from sources like wind farms and solar facilities. With pumped hydroelectric storage, dams can also save energy at times when production exceeds demand, and do so in a way that is reasonably efficient.

Climate change impacts also support the call for more dams. The loss of glaciers and snowpack mean that natural water flows are going to become more variable. More and larger dams could help to smooth that out, as well as compensate for how our current hydroelectric infrastructure will face challenges as a result of decreased summer water flow.

Climate change is making many people re-think nuclear power, a source of electricity with a lot more black marks against it than hydroelectricity has. As such, I think we should be glad that many past attempts by environmentalists to block dams have failed, and we should strive to support their further development where suitable sites exist.

Building fission bombs

As recommended by a fellow attendee at the unofficial summer ‘grill thrill’ barbecues, I am currently reading Richard Rhodes’ Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. While the book can be detailed to the point of exhaustion sometimes, it does contain a lot of interesting information, on everything from atomic bomb design to the differences in governmental structure and operation in the United States and Soviet Union.

One thing the book has definitely done is diminish my concerns about terrorists building nuclear weapons. Even the ‘simple’ gun-type configuration uranium bomb is a lot more complicated that many of the diagrams and descriptions I have seen would make you believe. A plutonium implosion device is far more complex still. Getting from a sufficient quantity of fissile material to a working bomb is an extremely complex undertaking, requiring a lot of equipment and expertise. It also requires a lot of exotic materials and manufacturing processes. It is certainly easier now than it was for the Russians in 1949 (largely because more information is available), but the degree may not be as great as most people think. Because of espionnage, the Russians actually had the plans for the American bombs while they were building their own. Even under intense pressure from Stalin and Beria and with considerable resources (including access to industrial facilities and thousands of forced labourers), it took the Soviets four years to copy them. That makes it seem unlikely that terrorists without significant support from a state, access to industrial facilities, and high degrees of technical knowledge could emulate them.

Another interesting topic covered in the book is the hasty abandonment of Los Alamos at the end of the war. It would make interesting reading for those who saw the advent of atomic weapons as an immediate sea change in warfare. As it happened, there was apparently a long period after the war where no usable weapons were assembled and available, and the teams of people who would be required to make them so were dispersed around the United States, doing other things. The first bombs definitely weren’t designed with simplicity or shelf-life as a top priority. As a consequence, most of the deterrent effect of the bombs in the immediate post-war period was based around faulty information.

I will write a full review of the book when I have finished it.

[Update: 12 April 2010] My full review was online quite a while ago: Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb.

Ocean iron fertilization for geoengineering

The idea behind iron fertilization as a form of geoengineering is this: organisms in the ocean often have a rate of growth that is confined by the availability of a single nutrient. It’s like assembling laptops when there is only a limited amount of silicon around for processors. No matter how many cases, keyboards, and screens you can build, you can’t make finished laptops until you get more silicon. Since iron is often a growth-limiting nutrient in the ocean, the hope is that humans could add it to the sea, causing a bloom in ocean plant life. Those living things would draw carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and then, hopefully, sink to the bottom of the sea and keep the carbon trapped there for a long time.

Recently, scientists tried adding six tonnes of iron to the Southern Ocean, around Antarctica. The idea was to test whether such an approach could help draw down the level of CO2 in the atmosphere. As reported by the BBC, the experiment was not very successful. They quote Victor Smetacek as saying:

There’s been hope that one could remove some of the excess carbon dioxide – put it back where it came from, in a sense, because the petroleum we’re burning was originally made by the algae. But our results show this is going to be a small amount, almost negligible.

Basically, the problem seems to be that the algae get eaten by animals near the surface, rather than sinking undigested to the cold ocean floor. That means the carbon remains within the Earth’s physical and biological cycles, rather than sinking down to where it won’t have medium-term effects. It may be that fertilization experiments in other locations, or with other nutrients, prove more successful.

Some odd game theory surrounds geoengineering. One possibility is that no type of geoengineering will not work at all. Another is that it might lower temperatures, but have unacceptable other effects. People also worry that the very possibility of geoengineering makes policy-makers more reckless, since they see it as a possible long-term solution that eliminates the need to reduce emissions. From an environmental standpoint, it would be useful to know that geoengineering certainly would not work, since it would help avoid a dead-end technology and would make it even more clear that emissions must be sharply reduced. That being said, it may be environmentally harmful to learn that it is possible, especially if the harmful consequences will mostly be borne by people living in poor states with relatively low greenhouse gas emissions. Powerful states may be tempted to geoengineer their way out of the climate problem, even if the consequences for those in other parts of the world are appalling. Given how appalling the consequences of our greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be for future generations within our own states, it would not be surprising if voters and governments opt for such a negligent course of action. The fact that we are cheerfully committing suicide suggests that we will probably commit murder without the slightest concern or consideration. Of course, knowing that geoengineering is possible would give us one last desperate option, in the event that abrupt and catastrophic climate change begins.

As it stands, the world simply isn’t coordinated enough to prevent any research into geoengineering. All we can do is fight to ensure the information and techniques that are acquired be used in a responsible way: taking into account the welfare of people around the world, in both this generation and those that will follow.

Competitive games and collaborative results

Because it was recommended in a blog I read (though I cannot remember which), I am reading Herb Cohen’s You Can Negotiate Anything. While the book is quite dated in terms of views on race and sex, it does contain some interesting observations, many of which relate closely to politics and international relations. For instance, the author asserts that: “In order to achieve a collaborative result in a competitive environment, you have to play the game.”

What this suggests is that approaches that are superficially unifying, like Obama’s call for post-partisanship, are either naive or ploys in a system where trust is always conditional and ephemeral, as it is between political parties. It also speaks to the game theory reality that, in a situation where one party is considering only their own interests, while the other is trying to strike an equitable balance, the outcome will tilt in the direction of the selfish party: after all, people on both sides of the negotiation are thinking about the selfish party’s interests, while those of their counterparty are only getting half the attention.

When it comes to climate change, it does seem necessary to ‘play the game.’ Voters and politicians have been exposed to the chilling scientific projections ad nauseum, and yet very little real action has been undertaken at a global level. North America and Australia are particularly laggard, when it comes to doing something concrete. Of course, recognizing the need to engage in ‘game playing’ doesn’t put one much closer to having an effective strategy to overcome status quo opposition and bring the behaviour of firms, states, and individuals in line with what basic sanity demands.

On the complexity level of climate policies

When it comes to policies for regulating greenhouse gas emissions, complexity can conceivably serve three purposes. Two of them have some justification, while the third is largely reprehensible but entirely obvious and largely unavoidable. Unfortunately, it is the two dodgier options that are overwhelmingly more likely to emerge.

The first purpose is environmental effectiveness. For instance, we might add complexity to a pure carbon tax by also banning the construction of new coal-fired power plants. Doing so is likely to reduce emissions somewhat further, especially given that once a coal power plant is built, it takes a brave politician to refuse to grant an exception that will stop a carbon tax from bankrupting it, tossing out those who work there, and nullifying the investments of the financial backers.

The second purpose is economic efficiency. In some cases, it may be that a more complicated policy can achieve the same level of emissions reduction at a lower cost than a simpler one. It may also be that other economic objectives need to be sought in concert with greenhouse gas mitigation. For instance, we might want to increase the total portion of our energy use that comes from domestic sources.

The third purpose is being able to grant hidden favours to friends and contributors. As soon as you start giving away ‘grandfathered’ permits, creating tax exemptions, and the like you, open the door to both soft and hard forms of corruption. The more complex the set of regulations, the easier it is to conceal this. Once you start stacking on special rules for new facilities, different modes of compliance, and complex interactions between carbon policies and other forms of taxation and subsidy, you gain a dense canopy of rules, under which all sorts of shady business can be undertaken.

A government that realized the scope of the threat we face could put a simple policy in place in a matter of weeks or months. They could say:

“If we continue to emit at the level we are now doing, we will probably destroy the ability of the planet to sustain human civilization. This may well happen by the end of this century, especially if our emissions remain on an upward trajectory. To respond to this risk, we are implementing an economy-wide carbon tax. Every time fuel that generates greenhouse gasses is produced or imported, the producer or importer will pay the tax. The cost will then spread through the rest of the economy. This year, the tax will be $20 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. It will rise by $5 per year until at least 2030. We will use the revenues to provide financing for efficiency improvements in all sectors.”

Instead, we are likely to see governments that fail to appreciate the magnitude of the danger, but fully appreciate the opportunities new regulations provide for them to strengthen their electoral positions. As a consequence, there is a very strong possibility that we will fail to respond effectively to the threat of climate change before it becomes impossible to avoid catastrophic harm.

Free book on the oil sands

Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent is a book written by Andrew Nikiforuk, a Calgary journalist. The publisher, Greystone Books, has decided to make it available as a free PDF until Friday, March 20th. The book’s description suggests that it is very critical of the oil sands industry, overall:

This out-of-control megaproject is polluting the air, poisoning the water, and destroying boreal forest at a rate almost too rapid to be imagined. In this hard-hitting book, journalist Andrew Nikiforuk exposes the disastrous environmental, social, and political costs of the tar sands and argues forcefully for change.

Getting the PDF requires that you give them your email address. Of course, you can always buy the book if you prefer.

More about this is on Gristmill.

Crime fighting with DNA ‘family searches’

Over at Slate, there is an interesting and somewhat frightening article about the use of DNA in law enforcement in the United States. As in the UK, the US is now collecting DNA from many people who have been arrested, and retaining the samples even from those never charged or convicted. The next step along this path of DNA surveillance seems to be ‘family searches.’ Here, police look for near matches between crime scene DNA and people in their database. When they find a near match, they investigate that person’s family members.

This is worrisome for many reasons. As the article explains, “courts could well be troubled by the open-ended idea that once you’re arrested and cleared, the state can subject you and future generations of your family members to permanent genetic surveillance.” It is quite shocking really. These days, people are getting arrested for such trivialities as taking photos of major landmarks. The idea that this would then subject their entire family to future police DNA surveillance seems deeply illiberal. The article also makes the point that the DNA kept on file may be re-examined later to test for other traits: for instance, if genes that predispose people to committing rape or murder are discovered. Finally, the article mentions some of the major racial implications of the policy: given the high rates of arrest and incarceration in the African American community, members of that ethnic group are unusually likely to be subject to police surveillance via family searches.

Maintaining a functioning justice system in an era of rapidly changing technologies is a huge challenge. Arguably, search and surveillance are the most worrisome new issues. The automation of both means that huge databases can be maintained tracking emails, cell phone locations, DNA, and much else besides. These databases will inevitably be accidentally leaked and intentionally abused. Just another reason why governments are far more dangerous than terrorists.

Given the popularity of being ‘tough on crime,’ it is easy to see why many people favour a system that sacrifices privacy in exchange to a higher chance of catching criminals. There are certainly arguments on both sides. DNA can help to free the wrongfully convicted, as well as increase the conviction rate for crimes like rape, when the justice system generally does a rotten job of catching perpetrators. Arguably, the fairest system would be to put everyone’s DNA on file. At least that way people would be receiving equal treatment. Of course, that requires putting even more trust and power in the hands of governments and security services that have too often abused it in the past.

Monbiot on adaptation and mitigation

George Monbiot’s dire new column highlights how the enormous danger associated with climate change has produced action that is grossly inadequate. Furthermore, it challenges the idea that we will be able to deal with it later by ‘adapting.’ He argues that the costs of doing so will be massive, some impacts will be impossible to lessen through any level of spending, and that rich nations presented with the immediate reality of massive climatic challenge will never have the will to assist poorer states.

It remains vital to understand that adaptation is pointless without mitigation. There is no adaptation possible, if the 5.5 to 7.1°C ‘business-as-usual’ path projected by the Hadley Centre is the one we follow. In order to have a world where adaptation remains a physical possibility, we need to be aggressively cutting greenhouse gas emissions, making sure their peak concentration does not reach a level where feedbacks will re-organize the world into something deeply hostile to humanity.

Institutionalizing concern for future generations

Within political and bureaucratic processes, nobody really speaks for future generations. In the area of the environment, there may be some voters, politicians, environmental non-governmental organizations (eNGOs), and bureaucrats who are concerned about the effects of current policies and behaviours on future generations. What is lacking is an organized mechanism through which those concerns can be made influential. At present, near-term concerns have an overwhelming grip on political influence. This is because of election cycles, as well as the willingness of almost everybody to delay pain and difficult decisions.

The question, then, is whether any political or bureaucratic mechanism could help shift the balance of influence towards those who are not yet here to express their preferences. Most depressingly, we could conclude that only extreme prosperity puts people in a position where they are willing to make small sacrifices for the benefit of future others. Arguably, Norway’s stabilization fund is an example of this. Most optimistically, it could be argued that all that is necessary is to provide clear information on the future consequences of present actions, and people will make changes voluntarily. Between those views is a perspective that focuses on building institutions that think for the long term. Doing so is certainly challenging, since such organizations must be shielded from year-to-year demands in order to function. That challenge is made even more acute by the necessity that, if any such organization is to be effective, some organization that currently exists and operates will need to cede some power to the new body.

Wood stoves, air pollution, and climate

Yesterday, Stella reminded me of one of the many trade-offs associated with climate change and environmental policies, generally. Montreal is considering a ban on new wood-burning appliances, on account of the local air pollution they cause. Wood certainly isn’t the cleanest burning stuff, especially when it is used in stoves that fail to achieve an ideal temperature and fuel-air mixture. That being said, burning sustainably harvested wood does not add greenhouse gasses to the atmosphere. This is because the trees being grown to supply the wood absorb as much carbon as the stoves are emitting.

In the long run, only biomass and renewables offer the prospect of unending energy. Encouraging the development of both is thus critical to making the transition to a zero-carbon global society. At the same time, other drawbacks do need to be considered: whether it’s the land and water use associated with biofuel production, the air pollution from biomass burning, or the damage caused by dams. These trade-offs illustrate how technology is never really a self-sufficient answer to environmental problems.

There are also further complexities on the climate side. What is the source of the wood? Is logging altering the albedo of the area, leading to greater or lesser absorption of solar radiation? Are the trees being felled absorbing atmospheric carbon at the same rate as the trees that will replace them? What are the climatic impacts of the physical cutting and transportation of the wood? What effect will the aerosols from the wood burning have on climate?

In the specific case of Montreal’s wood-burning stoves, I don’t know enough about the trade-offs involved to make a sensible suggestion. Perhaps it would be better to mandate that any wood-burning appliances meet emissions standards, rather than banning them completely, or perhaps that is infeasible for some reason and only a ban will work. For instance, it might just be too costly and impractical to create and enforce emissions standards for wood-fired devices. In the end, the business of living together in a finite world is inevitably one of compromise and politics.