After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ken Alibek – a formerly high ranking official within the Russian biological weapons program – defected to the United States. His 1999 book can be seen as a declassified, commercial, civilian version of what he told the American intelligence officials who he initially debriefed. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Biological Weapons Program in the World focuses on the facilities of Biopreparat: an ostensibly civilian organization that was actually the major developer and stockpiler of biological weapons. They made anthrax and smallpox by the tonne, and developed mechanisms for deploying these agents ranging from assassination-type mechanisms to delivery via intercontinental ballistic missile.
Alibek makes a number of serious allegations:
- Russia developed biological weapons as far back as 1928, when work was done on weaponizing typhus;
- That Russia violated the Biological Weapons Convention from the start;
- That biological agents like plague and smallpox were genetically modified to be resistant to treatments and vaccines, to be more virulent, and to produce additional toxins;
- That Russia continued to develop and stockpile biological weapons after the Cold War ended;
- And that Russia used biological weapons, both against the Germans during WWII and against the Afghans during the Soviet invasion. In the first case, an attack on German Panzer troops ultimately ended up sickening far more Russian civilians than enemy soldiers.
Alibek’s book also provides considerable insight into the character of the Soviet system of government, including military and security matters. His perspective as an insider in the system is one of the most interesting aspects of the book, including his account of American inspections of Biopreparat facilities (and how he helped to trick them) and the Soviet inspections of US facilities like Fort Detrick that followed.
The book does have some flaws. As with any document on sensitive security matters, it is impossible to know how much of what is claimed is really accurate. Furthermore, this is the work of a defector, and Alibek goes to some length to try to highlight the good things he did. For example, he talks about trying to divert more of the production of a facility he ended up directing towards civilian medical purposes. He also omits any mention of the ‘Alibek’ strain of anthrax that he was responsible for developing. The book also jumps around chronologically in a way that can be confusing, and the chapter titles do not provide a very good sense of the content.
All told, Alibek’s book is interesting and worthwhile to read. It highlights how, alongside all the nuclear dangers of the Cold War, there was another separate type of appalling risk to civilian populations that had been created, and for which the legacy is enduring. Indeed, proliferation of biological weapons may well be a far more serious matter than proliferation of nuclear weapons. Building a working atomic bomb requires fissile material, knowledge, and engineering capability. By contrast, a biological weapon smuggled out of a lab in the pocket of an underpaid Soviet scientist can be duplicated to mass quantity in fermentors, with relatively little technological sophistication required.
That being said, it is worth nothing how biological weapons haven’t yet seemed to live up to their frightening potential. Alibek mentions the Japanese Aum cult as an example of a non-state entity that developed biological capabilities, and yet their attempts to actually employ biological agents failed to produce significant damage. That said, weapons in the hands of states like Russia that have had sophisticated weaponization and testing programs for decades are likely much more dangerous, as all the deaths from the accidental Sverdlovsk anthrax leak illustrate.
The book talks very little about delivery systems for biological agents; quite possibly, that is in response to the particular sensitivity of such information, which may not yet be in the hands of groups that do have access to dangerous strains of bacteria and viruses. Alibek explains that:
Bioweapons are not rocket launchers. They cannot be loaded and fired. The most virulent culture in a test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents. (p.97 paperback)
He goes on to explain that detailed recipes for the production and weaponization of biological agents were developed by Biopreparat, and that they were retained by the Russian government even after the collapse of communism. In a few months time, facilities re-purposed for civilian use could go back to making smallpox, anthrax, and plague by the tonne.
In light of the increasing authoritarianism of the Russian government, this book makes especially worrisome reading. Back in the Soviet era, the government blamed the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak on ‘contaminated meat.’ Black market vendors were even punished for their supposed role in causing the disaster. For a span after the fall of communism, the reality that it arose from a leak in a bioweapon production plant was acknowledged. More recently, the government has gone back to the old contaminated meat deception.
“KEN ALIBEK, who was once Kanatjan Alibekov, a leading Soviet bioweaponeer and the inventor of the world’s most powerful anthrax, shocked the American intelligence community when he defected, in 1992, and revealed how far the Soviet Union had gone with bioweapons. In a new book of his, entitled “Biohazard,” Alibek says that there were twenty tons of liquid smallpox kept on hand at Soviet military bases; it was kept ready for loading on biowarheads on missiles targeted on American cities. I contacted certain government sources and asked them if there was any evidence to corroborate Alibek’s claims.
One person who asked not to be named said, “I really have to be careful what I say. Yeah, Alibek’s claims have been corroborated in multiple ways. There’s not a lot of evidence. There’s some.”
Another person who asked not to be named said that the Soviet Union had put the biowarheads on ICBM missiles and test launched them sometime before 1991 over the Pacific Ocean. The United States — probably using spy satellites that orbited near the tests — was able to monitor the missiles as they soared into space and then punched back through the atmosphere and landed in the sea. The warheads were spinning weirdly: they were unusually heavy, and they had a strange shape. The warhead was heavy because it had an active refrigeration system to keep its temperature near or below the boiling temperature of water during reentry. Nuclear warheads don’t need to be actively cooled. Why would a warhead need to be cooled? Presumably, because it was designed to contain something alive. But what? The person said, “The warhead was built to carry a very small quantity of biological weapon. Anthrax wouldn’t have worked too well, because you need to put a lot of anthrax in the air to kill people, and anthrax isn’t contagious. With smallpox, you don’t need much. If you use smallpox, you get around the most difficult technical problem of bioweapons — the problem of dissemination. With smallpox, you use people as disseminators.” “
A bug’s life
How safe are health laboratories in developing countries?
AFRICA is home to the world’s nastiest diseases, such as the Ebola and Marburg viruses, and to laboratories that study them. Could that be a tempting target for terrorists? Late last year Senator Richard Lugar and a team of Pentagon arms-control experts visited Burundi, Uganda and Kenya. What they found prompted alarm, and calls for big spending on lab security.
For example, a Kenyan research lab housing anthrax, Ebola and Marburg backs onto a slum and has low, easily scaled cement walls. African technicians have to use large samples of the dangerous viruses for their research because their equipment is antiquated. Better safety could be part of the long-standing initiative Mr Lugar and his fellow senator Sam Nunn developed in 1991 to secure and destroy former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles.
It is no secret that the medical school was the Tokyo headquarters of Unit 731. Most of the unit’s activities took place in occupied Manchuria, in north-east China, where the victims of its ghastly experiments were Chinese, Koreans and Russians. They were exposed to plague and cholera. Those who suffered vivisection, including women made pregnant by the doctors, were called “lumber”.
Since 2002 Tokyo courts have at least acknowledged that Unit 731 took part in experiments in germ warfare. American documents also reveal that some American occupiers valued the results of the experiments, however horrific, and shielded the medics from trial for war crimes. Many of the unit’s staff went on to top positions in leading drugs firms and universities, and some set up Japan’s first commercial blood bank, Green Cross, which later became notorious when 200 Japanese died from transfusions of blood tainted with HIV.
Yet the government has never acknowledged Unit 731’s atrocities, even after mutilated skulls and bones were discovered in 1989 a few hundred yards from the excavation site. A black obelisk stands where the remains are buried, describing them merely as human “specimens”. Chinese requests for DNA samples to establish the identity of the remains have been rejected.
Explosion at Russian lab housing smallpox, Ebola and other diseases: reports
A gas cylinder exploded at a Russian laboratory known for holding dangerous pathogens on Monday.
The explosion, which occurred on the fifth floor of the building, caused a fire that burned about 30 square metres, according to a statement from the lab. It also blew out some windows, according to media reports.
One person was injured, and no dangerous pathogens escaped, the BBC reported Tuesday. No work with biological materials was going on in the affected portion of the lab, according to the BBC.
The Vector laboratory in Koltsovo, near Novosibirsk in Siberia, is one of two known laboratories in the world that maintains a stock of the smallpox virus, with the other being at the Centers for Disease Control in the U.S. It also reportedly holds Ebola, bird flu and other materials.